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ABSTRACT
Political Economy of Infrastructure Investment Allocation: Evidence from a Panel
of Large German Cities
by Achim Kemmerling and Andreas Stephan
This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contri-
bution of infrastructure accumulation to private production. A political-economy model
for the allocation of public infrastructure investment grants is formulated. Our empirical
findings, using a panel of large German cities for the years 1980, 1986, and 1988, sug-
gest that cities ruled by a council sharing the State (Bundesland) government's current
political affiliation were particularly successful in attracting infrastructure investment
grants. With regard to the contribution of infrastructure accumulation to growth, we find
that public capital is a significant factor for private production. Moreover, at least for the
sample studied, we find that simultaneity between output and public capital is weak;
thus, feedback effects from output to infrastructure are negligible.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Politische Ökonomie der Allokation von Infrastrukturinvestitionen: Empirische
Evidenz von einem Paneldatensatz großer deutscher Städte
Dieses Papier verwendet ein simultanes Gleichungssystem zur Schätzung des Beitrags
von Infrastrukturinvestitionen zu regionalem Wachstum. Ein polit-ökonomisches Mo-
dell der Allokation von Finanzzuweisungen für öffentliche Investitionen in Infrastruktur
wird formuliert. Unsere empirischen Ergebnisse basierend  auf einem Paneldatensatz für
große deutsche Städte in den Jahren 1980, 1986 und 1988 deuten darauf hin, dass Städ-
te, deren Mehrheit im Stadtrat die selbe politische Couleur wie die Landesregierung
hatte, erfolgreicher bei der Zuteilung von Finanzzuweisungen waren. Im Hinblick auf
den Beitrag der Infrastrukturakkumulation auf das Wachstum finden wir, dass öffentli-
ches Kapital ein wichtiger Faktor für die private Produktion ist. Weiterhin, zumindest
für den untersuchten Zeitraum, finden wir, dass die Simultanität zwischen Output und
öffentlichem Kapital gering ist; daher sind Feedback-Effekte von Output zur Infra-
struktur vernachlässigbar.
11. Introduction
This paper examines the role of public capital in private production and provides
a political-economy model of the allocation of public infrastructure investment
grants. From this perspective, our study links the literature on the productivity
effects of infrastructure with the literature on the political-economy of policy-
making.
Since Aschauer published an influential series of papers (1988, 1989a, 1989b,
1989c) about the effects of public infrastructure investment for long-run growth
and productivity in the U. S. and other major countries, there has been an on-
going debate about the role of public infrastructure in generating national wel-
fare. Aschauer (1989a), for example, using a production function approach with
aggregate time-series data for the U. S. from 1949 to 1985, found that the elasticity
of output with respect to a broad measure of public infrastructure was signifi-
cant and of a remarkable magnitude. At a time of widespread concern about the
slowdown of U. S. productivity growth in the 1970’s and 1980’s this finding sug-
gested that the general decline in public infrastructure spending in the U. S. since
the 1970’s could at least partly explain the observed slowdown in productivity
growth.
However, the magnitude of the estimated elasticity of infrastructure capital
in Aschauer (1989a, 1989b, 1995) and other studies (Garcia-Mila and McGuire,
1992; Munnell, 1990a; Munnell, 1990b; Munnell, 1992; Munnell, 1993) is still a
matter of discussion. The main focus of the so-called ‘infrastructure’ debate is
on the interpretation of results and on the appropriate empirical methodology
(Aaron, 1990; Gramlich, 1994; Holtz-Eakin, 1994). For example, it is argued that
the direction of causation is unclear, i.e., whether causality runs from infrastruc-
ture to growth or from growth to infrastructure (Tatom, 1991; Tatom, 1993). In
order to address the problem of causality econometrically several studies have
suggested simultaneous-equation-approaches with public infrastructure invest-
ment as an endogenous variable (e.g., Cadot et al., 1999; Duffy-Deno and Eberts,
1991; de Frutos and Pereira, 1993).
In this paper we adopt the simultaneous equation approach of Cadot et al.
(1999). This not only allows us to address the issue of endogeneity of infrastruc-
2ture investments, but also to test whether the German case gives comparable
results to the French ‘pork-barrel politics’ of investment decisions or whether
the peculiarities of the political system in Germany make a different way of po-
litical decisions about the allocation of public infrastructure investments more
plausible.
Previous studies on the role of fiscal federalism for infrastructure policy have
mainly focussed on optimal rules for the provision of infrastructure at different
levels of government (e.g., Hulten and Schwab, 1997). However, it remains an
open question whether infrastructure policies are in reality designed according
to such efficiency considerations. Therefore, the main contribution of our paper
is that we empirically shed light on other potential determinants of infrastructure
policies. What we suppose to be other potential determinants of infrastructure
policy are (i) ‘pork-barrel’ politics due to the influence of firms on the allocation
of investments or (ii) distortions in allocation due to the political affiliation of
governments at different levels. These influences may give rise to results that
might depart substantially from optimal allocation as a result of maximizing
social welfare.
In Cadot et al. (1999) a political-economy model is applied to explain the
regional allocation of public infrastructure investment. Here, we use a similar
model. One difference is, however, that the study by Cadot et al. (1999) focusses
on the allocation of infrastructure investment at the regional level in France,
whereas our study examines the allocation of infrastructure investment grants
at the level of large German cities. Specifically, we derive an econometric model
from a ‘menu auction game’ that was originally developed by Bernheim and
Whinston (1986a, 1986b) and has also been applied by Grossman and Helpman
(1994). This model is based on a very general framework for political-economy
analysis which views economic policy decisions as being a result of the maxi-
mization of objective functions by incumbent politicians under constraints that
are primarily political (see also Dixit, 1996).
Cadot et al. (1999) test their model using a panel data set of French regions and
find a significant relationship between the number of large firms in a region as an
indicator of lobbying strength and the infrastructure investment allocation. More-
over, they also find that political affiliation plays an important role in channelling
3public infrastructure towards regions that share the same ‘colour of government’.
The results of Cadot et al. (1999) are perfectly comparable with the political sci-
ence literature referring to the French system of decision-making (Frere, 1998).
High centralization and top-down administration – leaving comparatively little
space for local autonomy – make this system particularly vulnerable to lobbying
by large firms.
In contrast, as a result of federalism the German decision making system is
deeply nested and intertwined. The spheres of competence and control as well as
the financing of investment are not as separated as it is in the case of France or
the U. S. but they are overlapping and mutually dependent (Scharpf, 1988). This
makes an extension of the basic model inevitable.
Investment in municipal infrastructure usually consists of two parts: auto-
nomous investment and investment grants. Whereas the former is a matter of
decision for municipal councils the latter is predominantly provided by the fed-
eral States (‘Bundesla¨nder’). Because of the increasing role of investment grants
since the 1970’s we assume that these financial resources are heavily contested
among manufacturing firms. With fiscal federalism diluting political accountabil-
ity and channels of interest management, these firms might find it difficult to
divert infrastructure investment to their regions. This is a result of what we call
the logic of ’intertwined politics’. A possible exception might exist if local council
members could short-cut the bargaining process by means of vertical political
alignments.
With our empirical model we can test these two ideas – pork-barrel vs. in-
tertwined politics – on a panel data set consisting of 91 German cities for the
years 1980, 1986 and 1988. As in Cadot et al. (1999) we use a simultaneous-equa-
tions approach to estimate the relationship between infrastructure investments,
output, policy and lobbying variables. One of our main findings is that political
affiliation, measured by the coincidence of party colour between state and local
government, is decisive in explaining the distribution of investment grants.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss the
political lobbying framework, which Cadot et al. (1999) applied to the regional
allocation of infrastructure investments in France. In this section, we also deal
explicitly with two peculiarities of the German case in comparison to France:
4investment grant policy and fiscal federalism. Section 3 motivates our model of
the allocation of infrastructure investment grants across cities. In section 4 we de-
scribe the panel data used in the analysis and present the results of our empirical
estimations. Section 5 provides conclusions.
2. Modelling endogenous infrastructure investment decisions in Germany
2.1. THE ORIGINAL FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL LOBBYING FOR
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
In Cadot et al. (1999) a political-economy model is applied to explain the regional
allocation of public infrastructure investment. This model is based on a general
framework for political-economy analysis that views economic policy decisions
as a result of the maximization of objective functions by incumbent politicians
under constraints that are primarily political.
The starting point of this framework is the assumption that firms offer cam-
paign contributions to incumbent politicians in return for additional spending.
These contributions reflect the firms’ marginal willingness to pay for additional
infrastructure. Therefore, they reflect infrastructure’s marginal contribution to
firm value, both on the supply side, through the infrastructure’s contribution to
productivity in all sectors, and on the demand side for the construction industry
itself.
In the context of infrastructure investment the motivation for lobbying is the
following: Firms have vested interests in the quality of the infrastructure in those
municipalities where they have high sunk investment, which is usually the loca-
tion of production. The authors argue that large firms will lobby harder because
these firms produce, on average, for more distant markets and therefore use pub-
lic infrastructure more intensively than others. Moreover, large firms have two
strategic advantages. They are able to overcome problems of collective action
more easily than small enterprises and their form of lobbying – personal contacts
between big business and high politics – may be more efficient than the lobbying
activities of small firms.
5The underlying model of the political decision making system is quite simple:
Local politicians act as contribution collectors, providing their affiliated parties’
headquarters with locally generated campaign contributions. Furthermore, lo-
cal politicians propose public infrastructure projects – on behalf of the voters –
that are approved by central government. In contrast to Grossman and Helpman
(1994), Cadot et al. (1999) thus allow for two different levels in the decision mak-
ing process of infrastructure policy. Pointing to the high level of centralization the
authors argue that the basic model holds for the French case. Therefore, there is
no principal agent problem between local and central policy makers.
However, the assumption of a simple representative democracy, where all de-
cisions are made at the highest government level and than implemented by obe-
dient lower administrative officials is not valid for the German federal system as a
broad array of studies show (Garlichs, 1986; Scharpf, 1988; Scharpf, 1999). There-
fore, we will have to look with greater accuracy at the way German infrastructure
investment is financed.
2.2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GERMAN INVESTMENT GRANT POLICY
Infrastructure investment projects in Germany are usually financed from the re-
sources of two or more levels of governments. Here, we consider two different
financial sources for infrastructure investment: autonomous investment by mu-
nicipalities and investment grants1 provided by other institutions, e.g. the central
government (‘Bund’), the federal States (‘Bundesla¨nder’) the European Recov-
ery Program (ERP) or horizontal fiscal exchange mechanisms. In our context the
‘Bundesla¨nder’ are of particular interest because they provide the major part of
these grants (Pohlan, 1997). The procedure for starting a new infrastructure in-
vestment project is a complex arrangement between the local government, which
makes a proposal in the first stage of project planning, and the ‘La¨nder’ or ‘Bund’
administration that grants an investment subsidy. Because of the growing fiscal
tension in the local budgets (Pohlan, 1997), the role of investment subsidies has
risen through the 1980’s. In 1980 the ratio between investment subsidies from
‘Bund’, ‘Bundesla¨nder’ and the ERP to total investment in road infrastructure
was about 24 percent, whereas in 1988 this ratio rose to 46 percent. The munici-
6palities’ dependency on investment grants also makes it difficult for them to plan
investment projects autonomously. One reason for this is the overall increase of
insecurity in the planning process, as local decision makers cannot anticipate the
correct amount of future transfer payments (Bundesamt, 1986: 913).
Second, mixed financing of infrastructure projects undermines local political
autonomy. An example may illustrate this point: Schmals (1982) cites a case study
about public transportation in Munich at the end of the 1970’s. Two alternative
plans to improve public transport existed. The first plan proposed the construc-
tion of a network of underground railways to alleviate inner-city traffic. The
majority of city council members favoured this project. The second proposal, the
construction and improvement of a municipal railway system, was backed by the
Bavarian government. Because the Bavarian ‘Bundesland’ linked an investment
grant to the realization of the second project, the city council had to give in. Thus,
in this case investment grant prospects had a decisive impact on the bargaining
power between the two governmental levels.
The amount of investment subsidies granted to local infrastructure projects
formally depends on such external factors as car density, length of the road net-
work, etc. But as Garlichs (1986) shows in the case of infrastructure funds for
highways, the actual amount of money is a matter of intense bargaining between
lower level governments and the higher level. As for highways, the authorities
involved are the ‘Bund’ and the ‘Bundesla¨nder’ governments. But this also ap-
plies in the case of local infrastructure projects (Garlichs, 1986: 136). Frequently,
the result of the bargaining process is a quota system that reflects the traditional
or even legally settled principle of unanimity.
The increasing importance of investment grants for the realization of invest-
ment projects led us to model both sources (grants and autonomous investment)
separately in our simultaneous equation approach (see section 3 below). In order
to describe this simultaneous determination properly, our model has two equa-
tions: one which describes the autonomous investment decisions of the cities and
one which describes the level of investment grants the cities receive from higher
level governments. Furthermore, autonomous investment enters the grants equa-
tion and vice versa.
7From this model it is also possible to answer the question of whether the re-
lationship of autonomous investments and investment grants is complementary,
substitutional or neutral. But the existence of two mutually dependent levels of
government that both intervene in the decision making process of infrastructure
policy has even broader implications for the lobbying framework.
2.3. INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY AND THE ‘LOGIC OF INTERTWINED POLITICS’ IN
GERMANY
The underlying assumption of a simple (Westminster) representative democracy
seems to be severely violated in the German case. One of the reasons for this is the
peculiar nature of German federalism which has been characterized in literature
as a ‘unitary federal state’ (‘Verbundfo¨deralismus’ or ‘fo¨derativer Bundesstaat’).
In Germany, spheres of competence and control, as well as the financing of
investment, are not as separated as for example in the case of U. S. federalism.
Rather it is overlapping and mutually dependent. Therefore, although the states
(’Bundesla¨nder’) and the municipalities (‘Kommunen’) are exclusively respon-
sible for the main part of public infrastructure in a formal sense, investment
decisions also depend on the amount of public subsidies which come from either
the federal state, the federal states or from the European Union.
Moreover, German federalism is constitutionally obliged to balance local au-
tonomy and the uniformity of living conditions throughout German territory.
Humplick and Moini-Araghi (1996) show that this often results in a less efficient
provision of public infrastructure. Germany has a high standard of road infras-
tructure but its construction costs are higher than in other OECD countries. As
Humplick and Moini-Araghi (1996: 32) put it ‘the equity objective overrides the
efficiency objective’. These obligations in German federalism create the need for
a network of horizontal and vertical bargaining institutions that coordinate the
interests of the several governmental levels.
In our case it is difficult to specify the exact locus of decision making power for
road infrastructure investment. Abstracting from the federal state or relationships
with the E. U. , we have two important levels in the German political system, each
with its own interests: ‘Bundesla¨nder’ and local governments. ‘Bundesla¨nder’
8governments want – among other things – to maximize the welfare of their terri-
tory and try to balance diverging regional developments. The local governments
try to get as many investment grants as possible (pork-barrel politics). Both levels
are forced to bargain as the ‘Bundesla¨nder’ government wants to intervene but
lacks information about where to do so whereas the local governments compete
with each other for scarce resources.
This phenomenon is easily visible in all policy areas that bind different Ger-
man government levels together, and it is often cited as ‘intertwined politics’
(‘Politikverflechtung’). In our context it describes the pathological situation when
municipalities and the States lack the autonomy to make their own decisions,
whereas the ‘Bundesland’ simultaneously lacks information to control the other
governmental levels, so that neither of the two governmental levels is able (and
inclined) to provide investment allocation efficiently. Moreover, political account-
ability is diluted because there is no single agent that bears all the responsibil-
ity for a single policy. There are many studies that show the negative effects of
‘intertwined politics’ in Germany (Scharpf et al., 1976; Scharpf, 1988; Scharpf,
1999)
This might produce perilous effects for pluralistic lobbying such as in U. S.
interest mediation: a complex and closed system of decision making could be a
serious problem even for powerful lobbies.2 In other words, large firms will find
it extremely difficult to divert infrastructure investments to their region if there
is no way of short-cutting the bargaining process by means of vertical political
alignments.
In our political-economy framework we are especially interested in political
variables that influence the allocation of investment subsidies. We argue that
because of the complex federal system as described above by the notion of ‘in-
tertwined politics’ those local governments whose political ‘colour’ corresponds
to that of the ‘La¨nder’-government get more investment subsidies, because this
lowers the transaction costs of information transmission between governments.
The identity of political colour shortcuts this bargaining process and favours
certain municipalities by means of party loyalty.
Whether German infrastructure policy follows the logic of the lobbying frame-
work, that of ‘intertwined politics’ or both is the fundamental question for the
9empirical estimation. But let us first summarize the structure of our model with
the whole set of hypotheses.
3. Structure of the model
Our model is based on 3 equations, which we label as (i) production function, (ii)
city i0s lobbying function and (iii) city i0s infrastructure investment function.
3.1. PRODUCTION FUNCTION
To begin with, we assume that the production Qit of the manufacturing sector can
be described as
Qit = f (t, Kit , Lit, Git), i = 1 . . . N, t = 1 . . . T, (1)
where t denotes time, Qit output, Kit private capital, Lit labour input and Git de-
notes the infrastructure stock in city i. In addition, city i’s infrastructure stock Git
is defined as
Git = (1 − γ)Gi,t−1 + INVit + GRANTSit , (2)
where γ denotes the depreciation rate of public capital, INVit denotes infrastruc-
ture investment, and GRANTit denotes infrastructure investment grants given to
city i from the State (‘Bundesland’) government. Therefore, total infrastructure
investment in city i is defined as INVit + GRANTit.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas functional form for the manufacturing sector’s pro-
duction function in city i at time t we get
Qit = A0 exp(tt) LLit K
K
it G
G
it , (3)
where X denotes the elasticity of output Q with respect to input X, and X 2
ft, L, K, Gg. Dividing by Lit, (3) becomes
qit = A0 exp(tt) kKit g
G
it L
˜L
it , (4)
where small capitals denote variables in terms of the labour input L and ˜L is
defined as ˜L = L +K +G − 1.
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Note that ˜L will equal zero if returns to scale are constant with respect to all
inputs, i.e., L, K and G; and ˜L −G will equal zero if returns to scale are constant
with respect to private inputs L and K.
3.2. CITY i0S LOBBYING FUNCTION
City i0s lobbying function for state investment grants can be described as follows
GRANTit = f (Qit, INVit, policy variables, lobbying variables). (5)
Thus, we assume that GRANTit depends on investment decisions, i.e., INVit, but
also on a set of policy, ‘lobbying’ and other (exogenous) variables. For instance, we
expect that a city will receive more grants if it has a lower initial income, or a
lower growth of Qit in a previous period relative to other cities. Subsequently, the
‘Bundesland’ government will use its investment grant policy to promote growth
in ‘poorer’ cities. On the other hand, we assume that firms in the manufacturing
sector have sunk investment giving them vested interests in the quality of in-
frastructure in cities where they have establishments and production units. The
reason is that firms of the manufacturing sector quite often produce for more
distant markets than for example firms of the service sector. Therefore, firms in
the manufacturing sector in a given city should be expected to lobby harder than
other firms for the maintenance and upgrading of that city’s infrastructure.
The form of lobbying we suppose is fairly simple. Firms offer campaign contri-
bution to local politicians in return for additional infrastructure spending. Local
politicians act as campaign contribution collectors, final decisions about infras-
tructure investment grants are made at the state (‘Bundesland’) level.
The lobbying game can be motivated as follows. Following Bernheim and
Whinston (1986a), and Grossman and Helpman (1994), lobbying activities are
modelled as a ‘menu’ auction, whereby several lobbies bid non-cooperatively
for influence over a policy variable determined by an auctioneer, in our case the
‘Bundesland’ government. The main difference between a menu and a standard
auction is, that in the former bids are functions and not just a non-negative real
number as in the standard auction and all players end up paying something,
whereas in the standard auction only the winner pays.
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To formalize this idea, let us assume that there is a set L of principals (lobbies),
in our case the councils of large cities. The auctioneer, in our case the ‘Bundesland’
government, may choose an allocation of public investment grant allocations
grantt = (grant1t , ..., grantnt) from a set X. The set X is bounded so that each
investment grant policy granti must lie between some minimum granti and some
maximum granti.
In each period, cities indexed by i = 1, ..., n simultaneously face the ‘Bundes-
land’ government, if it is of the same political affiliation, with monetary trans-
fer offers Cit(grantt) conditioned on the vector grantt. These monetary transfers
can be interpreted in our context as campaign contribution from manufactur-
ing firms which have establishments in a given city. Hence, local politicians act
as contribution collectors. The ‘Bundesland’ government then chooses a value
grantt of the policy vector grantt that maximizes an objective function G[grantt,
åi Cit(grantt)]. Finally, the cities make transfers Cit(grant

t ) to the ‘Bundesland’
government as promised.
An equilibrium of this game is a set of contribution functions fCi (grant)g,
one for each city, such that each one maximizes the welfare of the city given the
schedules set by the other cities and the anticipated political optimization by the
‘Bundesland’ government, and a vector grant that maximizes the government’s
objective taking the contribution schedules as given (Grossman and Helpman,
1994).
Social welfare will be of concern to the government because voters are more
likely to re-elect a government that has established a high standard of liv-
ing. Suppose the ‘Bundesland’ governments objective function is given as G =
åi2L Ci(grant) + aW(grant) with weight a  0, and W represents aggregate
gross-of-contributions welfare. Thus, the government objective function is given
as a weighted sum of campaign contributions and aggregate welfare. Aggre-
gate gross welfare is defined as W  åni=1 wi(grant), where wi is the level of
welfare3 in city i, and wi depends on the level of grants with ¶wi=¶granti > 0,
¶2wi=¶grant2i < 0. The equilibrium of this game can be characterized as follows.
LEMMA 1. (B-W, 1986; G-H, 1994) (fCi gi2L, grant) is a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium if and only if:
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(a) Ci 2 Ci for all i 2 L,
(b) grant maximizes åi2L Ci (grant) + aW(grant) on X,
(c) grant maximizes Wj(grant)−Cj (grant)+ åi2L Ci (grant)+ aW(grant) for ev-
ery j 2 L,
(d) for every j 2 L there exists a grant j 2 X that maximizes åi2L Cj (grant) +
aW(grant) such that Cj (grant j) = 0.
For a proof of this Lemma see Bernheim and Whinston (1986a), Lemma 2. Con-
dition (a) states that the chosen contribution schedule is among those that are
feasible. Condition (b) states, that given the contribution schedules offered by the
cities, the government sets its policy to maximize its own welfare. Condition (c)
stipulates that for every city i, the equilibrium grant vector must maximize the
joint welfare of that city and of the government, given the contribution schedules
of the other lobbies. Condition (d) states that there is always an optimal action for
each city with zero contribution which the government finds equally attractive as
the equilibrium policy vector grant.
One appealing characteristic of this game, which is of special relevance for
our problem of grant allocation, is that in equilibrium players announce their
true willingness-to-pay. Thus, a truthful payment function for lobby i rewards the
government for every change in the action with exactly the amount of change in
the lobbies’ welfare. This resembles the so-called Groves-Clarke mechanism in
the context of bidding for public projects (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973).
From this model, we expect that (i) the political affiliation of a city’s council,
and (ii) the number of manufacturing firms in a given city will affect the level of
grants which a city receives.
3.3. CITY i0S INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT FUNCTION
Finally, we assume that public investment in city i can be described by the equa-
tion
INVit = f (Qit, GRANTit, policy variables, exogenous factors). (6)
Thus, city i0s investment (net of state grants) depend on investment grants but
also on a set of policy variables. For instance, if the expected productivity effects
13
of infrastructure in a city are high, the level of investment in this city should
be higher compared to cities where expected productivity effects are lower. Fur-
thermore, we expect that the higher the trade tax income of a city is, the more
infrastructure projects it is able to finance. Similarly, the lower the level of debt
that a city has, the more infrastructure projects the city is able to carry out. Finally,
we expect that the higher the number of cars in a city, the higher will be the
demand for additional road infrastructure projects.
Table I. Variable description and cities
Variable Description
Q Value added, manufacturing sector, million 1980 DM
L Hours worked in manufacturing sector, million hours
K Capital stock in manufacturing, million 1980 DM (from Deitmar, 1993
G Public infrastructure stock, million 1980 DM, (from Seitz, 1995)
INV Infrastructure investment, million 1980 DM
GRANT Infrastructure investment grants, million 1980 DM
DEBT Total debt of city, million 1980 DM
TAX Trade tax (‘Gewerbesteuer’) income of city i, million 1980 DM
CARS Number of registered cars per capita
NFIRMS Number of manufacturing firms in city i
DMINING Dummy variable equal to 1 when mining industry
is present in city i
PARTISAN Percentage of members in city council with the same
political affiliation as the government of ‘Bundesland’
4. Empirical implementation
4.1. DATA
We use a panel data set consisting of 91 German cities and three distinct years.
Table 1 provides a brief overview of the variables used in the analysis.
The data is taken from the ‘Statistical Yearbook of German Cities and Muni-
cipalities’,4 which contains information about 500 German municipalities and
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Table II. Cities in panel
Cities in Panel
1 Aachen 32 Heidelberg 63 Offenbach/Main
2 Amberg 33 Heilbronn 64 Oldenburg
3 Ansbach 34 Herne 65 Osnabru¨ck
4 Aschaffenburg 35 Hof 66 Paderborn
5 Augsburg 36 Ingolstadt 67 Passau
6 Baden-Baden 37 Kaiserslautern 68 Pforzheim
7 Bamberg 38 Karlsruhe 69 Pirmasens
8 Bayreuth 39 Kassel 70 Recklinghausen
9 Bielefeld 40 Kaufbeuren 71 Regensburg
10 Bochum 41 Kempten/Allga¨u 72 Remscheid
11 Bonn 42 Kiel 73 Rosenheim
12 Bottrop 43 Koblenz 74 Saarbru¨cken
13 Braunschweig 44 Ko¨ln 75 Salzgitter
14 Coburg 45 Krefeld 76 Schwabach
15 Darmstadt 46 Landau/Pfalz 77 Schweinfurt
16 Delmenhorst 47 Landshut 78 Siegen
17 Dortmund 48 Leverkusen 79 Solingen
18 Duisburg 49 Lu¨beck 80 Speyer
19 Du¨sseldorf 50 Ludwigshafen 81 Straubing
20 Erlangen 51 Mainz 82 Stuttgart
21 Essen 52 Mannheim 83 Trier
22 Flensburg 53 Memmingen 84 Ulm
23 Frankenthal/Pfalz 54 Mo¨nchengladbach 85 Weiden/Oberpfalz
24 Frankfurt/Main 55 Mu¨lheim/Ruhr 86 Wiesbaden
25 Freiburg/Berisgau 56 Mu¨nchen 87 Wilhelmshaven
26 Fu¨rth 57 Mu¨nster/Westfalen 88 Worms
27 Gelsenkirchen 58 Neumu¨nster 89 Wuppertal
28 Go¨ttingen 59 Neuss 90 Wu¨rzburg
29 Hagen 60 Neustadt/Weinstraße 91 Zweibru¨cken
30 Hamm 61 Nu¨rnberg
not included because of missing values for one or more variables
cities. For reasons of comparability we have selected 91 cities that are predom-
inantly self-administered at the local level (‘kreisfreie Sta¨dte’). This is of special
importance as part of our model explicitly deals with the political-economy of
these administratively comparable cities. Table 2 displays the names of the cities
in the sample. Note that some cities have been excluded from the estimation due
to missing values for one or more variables.
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Table III. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. C.V. Minimum Maximum
Q 2099.1 2500.3 119.1 144.3 15718.8
G 2468.8 2834.5 114.8 302.5 18176.1
K 4087.7 5007.6 122.5 252.0 25714.9
L 30.74 29.08 94.6 2.4 168.2
INV 93.6 123.8 132.3 8.1 1040.4
GRANT 32.8 44.7 136.3 0.8 266.1
DEBT 407.9 509.1 124.8 14.3 3066.7
TAX 135.6 210.4 155.2 7.1 1314.6
CARS 0.459 0.054 11.9 0.347 0.613
NFIRMS 124.0 101.1 81.5 21 637
DMINING 0.126 0.333 263.4 0 1
PARTISAN 45.9 8.0 17.5 29.0 68.2
Total number of observations with non-missing values: 261
Output (Q), measured as gross value added of a city’s manufacturing sector,5
is taken from a joint publication of several German statistical offices.6 These data
are not available for each year, so we could use only the three years 1980, 1986,
and 1988 for our analysis.
The private capital stock (K) of the manufacturing sector is taken from Deitmar
(1993). It is given in 1980 prices and has been also carefully corrected for the terri-
torial reforms that occurred in the 1970’s in Germany.7 The infrastructure capital
stock (G), which includes investment both for construction and equipments, is
taken from Seitz (1994) and is also measured in 1980 prices.8
Annual investment in infrastructure (INV) has been obtained from the statisti-
cal yearbook mentioned above. From the same source we have also obtained the
following variables: labour input (L), operationalized by the number of working
hours in the manufacturing sector; special grant-in-aids (‘Finanzzuweisungen’)
for investments (GRANTS) from ‘Bundesla¨nder’, ‘Bund’ or ERP; several mea-
sures of the financial situation of a city like the cumulated debt (DEBT) or trade
taxes (TAX) which are levied at the local level of cities, the number of four wheel
vehicles per 1000 inhabitants (CARS), and the number of manufacturing firms
(NFIRMS) in a city.
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Furthermore, we constructed a political variable denoted as PARTISAN to
measure the congruence between the local city government and the ‘Bundesland’
government. It gives the percentage of seats in the city council with the same po-
litical affiliation as the ‘Bundesland’ government where the city is located. Thus,
this variable is an indicator of the political ‘lobbying’ strength of a city relative to
the other cities in the same ‘Bundesland’.
Table 3 displays some descriptive statistics of the variables. Note, for instance
that grants are on average about one-third of autonomous investments. Annual
infrastructure investment undertaken by cities is on average about 3.8 percent of
the existing infrastructure capital stock. The mining industry is present in about
13 percent of cities in our sample. The partisan variable is on average 45.9 percent,
with a minimum of 29.0 and a maximum of 68.2 percent.
As described in the previous section, our model contains the following 3 equa-
tions:
Production function
ln qit = i +t +K ln kit +G ln(gi,t−1 + invit + grantit) + ˜L ln(Lit)
+MININGDMININGi + 1it, (7)
Lobbying function
grantit = γi + γt + γINVinvit + γbqbqit + γq80qi,80 + γggi,t−1
+γNFIRMSNFIRMSit + γPARTISANPARTISAN
+γMININGDMININGi + 2it, (8)
Investment function
invit = i +t +GRANTgrantit +bqbqit +q80qi,80
+ggi,t−1 +PRODGqit=gi,t−1 +DEBTdebtit
+TAXtaxit +CARSCARSit +MININGDMININGi + 3it, (9)
where we assume that kit, k = 1, 2, 3, are i.i.d. variables with mean zero and
variance i. Note, that variables with names in lower case are divided by the
labour input L.
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We include a dummy variable DMINING to all equations indicating whether
or not the mining industry is present in city i. Equation (7) refers to the production
function of the manufacturing sector in city i at time t. Equation (8) describes the
infrastructure investment grants which city i receives, whereas equation (9) refers
to the autonomous infrastructure investments undertaken by city i.
From the Cobb-Douglas production function, marginal productivity of infras-
tructure capital is defined as ¶Qit=¶Git = GQit=Git. We included this measure of
the expected productivity effects of infrastructure both in the ‘lobbying’ and the
‘investment’ function. Since git also contains current investment invit, we replaced
it with its lagged value gi,t−1.
Our estimation strategy is as follows: first, we estimate a ‘Between’ regression.
Thus, for each city observations for the years 1980, 1986 and 1988 are averaged.
Then, we estimate a two-way fixed-effects (‘Within’) Panel data model, where
dummy variables for cities and years are included. Finally, a restricted version
of the previous model is estimated, where instead of the whole set of 81 city
dummy variables only a set of 8 ‘Bundesland’ dummy variables is included. The
usual rank and order conditions for the identification of the parameters in the
simultaneous system of equations are satisfied.
Table IV shows the results of the ‘Between’ regression. The estimates of the ‘Be-
tween’ regression can be interpreted as ‘long-run’ parameters. Furthermore, the
‘Between’ analysis is appealing in our context since we are interested in the allo-
cation across cities, and this cross-sectional variation is captured by the ‘Between’
variance.
The number of observations for this model is 87. In order to compare the
results for different estimators, the simultaneous system (7)-(9) was estimated
with (1) non-linear OLS, (2) non-linear 2SLS, (3) non-linear 3SLS, and (4) with
non-linear Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). Dummy variables for
‘Bundesla¨nder’ (denoted ‘BuLa’) have been also included.
It is worth noting that for all 3 equations the fit of regression is remarkably
good. We performed White’s (1980) test for heteroscedasticity, which because of
its generality is also a test for misspecification of the model. None of the tests
is significant at a 10 percent level, thus the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity
is not rejected. The condition numbers are between 82 und 94. Except for the
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Table IV. Empirical results for ‘Between’ regression
Nonlinear OLS 2SLS 3SLS FIML
Production function: ln qit
i BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects
K 0.668 (7.78) 0.691 (7.93) 0.685 (7.87) 0.658 (8.26)
G 0.130 (1.70) 0.082 (1.00) 0.086 (1.04) 0.130 (1.82)
˜L 0.033 (0.79) 0.020 (0.47) 0.023 (0.55) 0.039 (1.02)
MINING -0.474 (-4.61) -0.484 (-4.68) -0.483 (-4.68) -0.474 (-4.94)
White 2(39) 19.0 18.42 18.52 19.17
R2 0.667 0.665 0.665 0.667
Lobbying function: grantit
γi BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects
γinv 0.162 (2.44) 0.118 (0.68) 0.111 (0.64) 0.157 (1.01)
γbq -0.733 (-2.78) -0.799 (-2.62) -0.809 (-2.66) -0.729 (-3.27)
γq80 -0.006 (-2.28) -0.008 (-2.06) -0.008 (-2.14) -0.006 (-3.17)
γG 0.011 (4.55) 0.013 (2.68) 0.013 (2.75) 0.011 (2.54)
γPROD 1.616 (0.97) 3.919 (0.74) 3.891 (0.78) 1.586 (1.15)
γPARTISAN 0.025 (3.18) 0.026 (3.04) 0.026 (3.03) 0.025 (3.57)
γNFIRMS 0.001 (0.52) 0.001 (0.48) 0.001 (0.62) 0.001 (0.56)
γDMINING 0.289 (1.39) 0.256 (1.03) 0.253 (1.02) 0.285 (1.26)
White 2(85) 86.82 86.78 86.77 86.82
R2 0.756 0.753 0.753 0.756
Investment function: invit
i BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects
grant 0.373 (2.09) -0.221 (-0.40) -0.173 (-0.31) 0.029 (0.06)
bq 0.210 (0.46) 0.056 (0.10) 0.034 (0.06) -0.023 (-0.05)
q80 -0.001 (-0.23) -0.001 (-0.14) -0.003 (-0.39) -0.005 (-1.21)
G 0.028 (6.47) 0.034 (4.16) 0.034 (4.19) 0.033 (4.37)
PROD -1.170 (-0.51) -4.507 (-0.62) -3.698 (-0.57) -1.324 (-0.68)
DEBT -0.055 (-3.26) -0.057 (-3.07) -0.057 (-3.08) -0.056 (-3.62)
TAX 0.013 (0.60) 0.015 (0.63) 0.011 (0.48) 0.015 (0.77)
CAR 3.032 (1.02) 4.092 (1.23) 4.112 (1.26) 3.544 (1.28)
DMINING -1.022 (-3.11) -0.764 (-1.78) -0.811 (-1.9) -0.926 (-2.51)
White 2(86) 87.0 87.0 87.0 87.0
R2 0.834 0.806 0.810 0.823
Condition-
Number 82.36 88.34 94.05 89.53
Obs. 87 87 87 87
t-values are given in parentheses.  at 10 %,  at 5 %,  at 1 % significant.
Hausman test statistic 2SLS vs. OLS: 1.484 (2), 45 df.
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Table V. Correlation of equation resid-
uals from OLS estimation, table IV
Corr ln qit grantit invit
ln qit 1.0000 0.0882 -0.0001
grantit 0.0882 1.0000 -0.2261
invit -0.0001 -0.2261 1.0000
parameters of endogenous variables (G, γinv, γPROD, grant, PROD), parame-
ter estimates turn out to be fairly robust with respect to the applied estimation
methodologies (OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS, FIML). The correlations of equation residuals
from OLS estimation are presented in table V. These correlations are relatively
low, indicating that there will not be much gain in efficiency from the system
estimation methods 3SLS and FIML compared to OLS.
We also performed a Hausman test on the difference of estimates between OLS
and 2SLS estimation. This test statistic is 1.484 with 45 degrees of freedom, which
implies that estimates of OLS and 2SLS do not differ significantly. Hence, due to
lower variance of OLS compared to instrumental variable techniques the former
is the preferred estimation method.
The estimate for private capital is significant at a 1 percent level for all estima-
tions. In contrast to this, the estimate for infrastructure capital is only significant
at a 10 percent level for OLS and FIML estimation. Constant returns to scale are
not rejected for all estimations, which can be concluded from the insignificance
of ˜L. The dummy variable DMINING, indicating whether the mining industry
is present in city or not, is highly significant with a negative coefficient. Thus,
expected output of the manufacturing sector in cities with mining is lower than
in cities without a mining industry. The ‘Bundesla¨nder’ dummy variables are
significant. Hence, expected output of cities’ manufacturing sectors are different
depending on the ‘Bundesland’ in which they are located.
Turning to the lobbying function, we find for OLS estimation that the level of
(autonomous) investment γinv is positively related to the level of grants which
city i receives. Thus, grants and investment appear to be complementary to each
other, i.e., there is no indication of a substitution effect of grants on investment.
Furthermore, we find that the lower a city’s initial income q80 and the lower
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its growth rate bq of the manufacturing sector in the period 1980-88, the higher
is the expected level of grants a city receives. Hence, policy considerations of
higher level governments to promote growth in ‘poorer’ cities or cities with poor
economic performance seem to be evident.
On the other hand, expected productivity effects (γPROD) of infrastructure
investment appear not to matter for the allocation of investment grants. One
explanation for this finding is given by Seidel and Vesper (1999). They state that
investment grant decisions from the federal government are based on consensus
between all states, so that ‘[...] this approach is prone to produce decisions that
carefully skirt all areas of conflict. In terms of economic efficiency, the solution
will often seem less than optimal, as there can be no guarantee that the money is
being put to its most productive use.’
Furthermore, the higher the infrastructure stock of the city (γG), the higher
the expected level of grants it receives. Since the ‘La¨nder’ dummy variables are
significant at a 10 percent level, there is some evidence that there is a systematic
difference between the level of grants cities in the various ‘Bundesla¨nder’ receive.
Lobbying activities of manufacturing firms, as indicated by the coefficient for
the number of firms (NFIRMS), do not appear to be important for infrastruc-
ture investment grant decisions. However, the estimate for the partisan variable
(PARTISAN) is significant, which means that the expected level of grants is
higher if the local city council and the state (‘Bundesland’) government share
the same political affiliation. We interpret this finding as an indication that short-
cutting of the bargaining process between cities and the federal states govern-
ments by means of vertical political alignments is indeed important.
Turning to the investment function, from the significance and the positive sign
of grant in the OLS estimation we conclude, again, that grants and investments
are complementary. In contrast to the lobbying function, policy variables, such
as the initial income q80 or the growth rate bq, are not significant predictors for
expected investment level of city i. Also, the expected return from infrastructure
investments, PROD, is not significant. However, we find that the higher the level
of DEBT, the lower the city’s infrastructure spending, which is a very plausible
finding. This corroborates our initial assumption that the financial room for ma-
noeuvre is decisive for local infrastructure investments. On the other hand, trade
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tax income of a city TAX is not significant for its investment decisions. Expected
investments are lower in cities where the mining industry is present. Finally,
the coefficient for the number of cars (CAR) is not a significant determinant for
investment decisions.
Table VI presents the results for the ‘Within’ (fixed-effects) regression. This
regression is based on the full sample of 261 observations having non-missing
values. Here we have included dummies both for cities as well as for time peri-
ods. Note first that for this model it is not possible to include the variables qi,80,
bqit and DMININGi because these are constant for each city i and hence would be
perfect collinear with the fixed-effects for cities if included.
It turns out that the city effects are highly significant for all equations, whereas
the time-effects are only significant for the production and investment function.
The fit of the production function is fairly high (R2 is about 0.95) but the esti-
mated coefficients are not plausible, except that for private capital (K). The high
condition number of 2148 indicates that for this model the degree of collinearity
might cause estimation problems. This is due to the high correlation of the fixed
effects with some of the variables (see also Ai and Cassou, 1997). This is partic-
ularly true for variables which do not vary much (i.e. have not enough ‘Within’
variation) over the 3 sample years 1980, 1986, and 1988, e.g. the infrastructure
stock G. In fact, the estimation of the parameter G is adversely affected by this
multicollinearity.
A preferred estimation strategy is therefore to impose some restrictions on the
parameters in order to reduce the degree of collinearity. Table VII gives the results
for a restricted regression. It is again based on 261 observations as in table VI.
However, in table VII we have included ‘Bundesla¨nder’ dummy variables instead
of the city dummy variables. One can construct the 9 ‘Bundesla¨nder’ dummies
from the 87 city dummy variables using 72 restrictions.
Note first, that as expected the condition number for the ‘restricted’ regression
is lower than that of the ‘Within’ regression. However, testing the imposed restric-
tions with a Wald test it turns out that these are rejected on a 1 percent level. In
our case therefore we have to deal with a trade-off between a potential estimation
bias by imposing ‘false’ restrictions on the one hand and reducing collinearity and
thereby gaining precision of estimates on the other hand.
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Table VI. Empirical results for
‘Within’ (panel) regression
Nonlinear OLS
Production function: ln qit
i city-effects
t time-effects
K 0.309 (3.25)
G 1.310 (1.71)
˜L 1.264 (1.63)
R2 0.945
Lobbying function: grantit
γi city-effects
γt time-effects
γinv 0.106 (2.40)
γG 0.001 (0.10)
γPROD -0.215 (-0.99)
γPARTISAN -0.027 (-1.88)
γNFIRMS 0.003 (0.76)
R2 0.765
Investment function: invit
i city-effects
t time-effects
grant 0.305 (2.31)
G -0.021 (-1.90)
PROD 0.507 (1.20)
DEBT -0.038 (-1.14)
TAX 0.030 (0.38)
CAR 3.908 (0.75)
R2 0.831
Condition-
Number 2148
Obs. 261
t-values are given in parentheses
 significant at 10 percent
 significant at 5 percent
significant at 1 percent
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Table VII. Empirical results for restricted (Panel) regression
Nonlinear OLS 2SLS 3SLS FIML
Production function: ln qit
i BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects
t time-effects time-effects time-effects time-effects
K 0.594 (10.84) 0.594 (10.84) 0.594 (10.97) 0.577 (11.01)
G 0.195 (3.91) 0.195 (3.90) 0.194 (3.91) 0.200 (4.13)
˜L 0.051 (1.88) 0.050 (1.87) 0.056 (2.11) 0.057 (2.21)
White 2(56) 67.73 67.71 68.0 69.3
R2 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.578
Lobbying function: grantit
γi BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects
γt time-effects time-effects time-effects time-effects
γinv 0.155 (4.63) 0.211 (5.07) 0.376 (9.87) 0.146 (1.16)
γG 0.008 (5.92) 0.006 (4.47) 0.003 (1.85) 0.008 (2.83)
γPROD -0.894 (-1.78) -0.856 (-1.64) -0.50 (-1.02) -0.234 (-0.40)
γPARTISAN 0.022 (3.83) 0.023 (4.01) 0.017 (3.26) 0.019 (3.29)
γNFIRMS 0.001 (-0.25) 0.001 (-0.10) 0.001 (0.17) 0.001 (0.27)
White 2(83) 141.1 140.4 147.2 140.3
R2 0.517 0.511 0.421 0.511
Investment function: invit
i BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects BuLa-effects
t time-effects time-effects time-effects time-effects
grant 0.446 (4.11) 0.652 (4.59) 1.238 (9.65) -0.573 (-0.88)
G 0.025 (7.60) 0.023 (6.54) 0.014 (4.46) 0.035 (4.24)
PROD 0.235 (0.29) 0.006 (0.01) -0.371 (-0.44) -2.528 (-1.89)
DEBT -0.043 (-2.89) -0.044 (-2.96) -0.035 (-2.64) -0.046 (-2.85)
TAX 0.034 (1.78) 0.036 (1.88) 0.027 (1.57) 0.028 (1.36)
CAR 6.961 (2.95) 6.731 (2.82) 4.969 (2.34) 7.948 (3.03)
White 2(98) 134.5 136.4 151.7 156.9
R2 0.619 0.613 0.527 0.490
Condition-
Number 61.5 61.7 74.5 75.4
Obs. 261 261 261 261
t-values are given in parentheses.  at 10 %,  at 5 %,  at 1 % significant.
Hausman test statistic 2SLS vs. OLS: 16.22 (2), 44 df.
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Table VIII. Correlation of equation
residuals from OLS estimation, table
VII
Corr ln qit grantit invit
ln qit 1.0000 0.1428 -0.0952
grantit 0.1428 1.0000 -0.2454
invit -0.0952 -0.2454 1.0000
With the restricted regression, like a ‘pooled’ regression, we capture both the
‘Within’ and the ‘Between’ variance. We can establish several main results from
table VII. First, we find that public capital is significant in the production func-
tion for all estimations, i.e. the public capital expenditure of cities is productive.
Second, it turns out that autonomous investment by cities and grants from higher
level governments are complementary. Third, it appears that if the majority of the
city council’s allegiance is the same as the political affiliation of the ‘Bundesland’
government, the expected level of grants a city receives is higher. Fourth, tax
income has a positive effect on investment decisions, while the level of debts of
a given city has a negative impact. Fifth, the number of cars in a city also turns
out to be a significant determinant for infrastructure investment decisions. Sixth
and finally, in contrast to the findings from Cadot et al. (1999) for France, we do
not find evidence that the number of manufacturing firms in a given city has an
influence on infrastructure investment decisions. Thus, the crucial findings of the
’Between’ regression also hold for the restricted ’Within’ model.
The reported Hausman test statistic again favours the null hypothesis of no
simultaneity between infrastructure capital and output. Hence, feedback effects
from output on infrastructure via the investment equation appear to be weak.
5. Conclusions
In this study we estimated a system of equations comprising of a production
function, an infrastructure investment function and an investment grant function
using a panel data set of large German cities. Several key empirical findings
emerge from these estimates. First, we find that the public capital expenditure
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of the cities in our sample are productive, i.e. public infrastructure is positively
linked with output of cities’ manufacturing sectors. Second, it appears that in-
frastructure investment and investment grants are complementary, i.e., there is
no evidence of a crowding out or substitutional effect from grants to cities au-
tonomous investment. Third, we find evidence that it is easier for a city to ob-
tain investment grants if the city council has the same political affiliation as the
higher-tier ‘Bundesland’ (state) government. Therefore, the allocation of grants
may depart substantially from an allocation that would be efficient and socially
optimal.
On the other hand, we do not find evidence that the number of manufactur-
ing firms is a significant determinant for the allocation of grants. This finding is
in contrast to a previous study on French regions by Cadot et al. (1999). One
potential explanation for this is that in France the politically and socially highly
centralized system makes it easy for large firms to intervene in politics. The hier-
archy in administration mostly prevents the establishment of several autonomous
sub-levels in the decision making process.
The German case diverges from France in several aspects: overlapping re-
sponsibilities of governments, diluted accountability, mixed financing, and ver-
tical and horizontal coordination (Scharpf, 1999), which we summarized in this
study as ‘intertwined politics’. Our empirical estimations show that in those cases
where the local council members share the same political affiliation, they perform
better in attracting investment grants. Thus, political lobbying takes place but
only between different governmental levels. Because of the peculiar nature of the
bargaining process there is not much room for political lobbying by large firms.
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Notes
1 These grants or subsidies from higher levels are called ‘Finanzzuweisungen’ (financial assign-
ments). One major example in the infrastructure context is municipality transport infrastructure
funds (‘GVFG’) that were created to promote transport infrastructure investment.
2 This is not to say that in Germany powerful lobbying is not possible. It just adopts a different
form. Individual firms which are having difficulties in lobbying for their own interests in a dis-
tribution game still can unite to increase the overall investment budget. Therefore, organizations
like the German Federation of Industries (BDI) participate vitally in infrastructure affairs. It is the
typical form of interest representation in ’corporatist’ democracies (Lehmbruch, 1984).
3 We assume that wi includes both consumers’ and producers’ welfare.
4 Original title: ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch der Sta¨dte und Gemeinden’.
5 This includes also the mining industries.
6 ‘Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der La¨nder, Bruttowertscho¨pfung der kreisfreien Sta¨d-
te, der Landkreise und der Arbeitsmarktregionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, Heft 26,
Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, 1995.
7 For further details, see Deitmar (1993).
8 We would like to thank Helmut Seitz for kindly providing us with these data.
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